Findings and Recommendations   Repatriation and Reintegration in Liberia: USCR Site Visit to Liberia, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire (October 1999) by Jeff Drumtra Published November 18, 1999 A. Security Conditions 1. Insecurity continues to limit access to Liberia's upper Lofa county. Partial reports in late October suggest continued population displacement in upper Lofa and persistent harassment and intimidation by Liberian security forces there. Parts of Upper Lofa remain insecure in the aftermath of two serious security incidents there in April and August 1999. Government security forces operating with tenuous chains of command continue to dominate upper Lofa county, particularly the Kolahun-Voinjama area, according to aid workers and others with limited access to the area. Highway checkpoints are numerous. Security personnel displayed belligerence toward a UNHCR convoy sent to upper Lofa in late October. Security personnel only grudgingly obeyed travel clearances issued to the UN convoy by government officials in Monrovia. In late October, the town of Voinjama remained largely empty of its normal inhabitants. Government soldiers and their families reportedly occupied many homes. Recommendation  Liberian government leaders, including the President, should conduct regular visits to upper Lofa county to discipline government soldiers and help resolve continued population displacement.   Recommendation The UN Special Representative in Liberia should work with the Liberian government to facilitate regular UN assessment trips to upper Lofa county to monitor humanitarian and human rights conditions there. The UN should support similar assessments by local NGOs and human rights organizations. 2.  Liberians are nervous about the potential for future instability. Years of upheaval have left many Liberians shaken and lacking confidence about the future. Virtually every Liberian was uprooted at some point during the seven-year war. Security incidents "up country" in Lofa county and elsewhere aggravate the sense of uncertainty in Monrovia. Some Liberians, for example, state privately that they plan to send their families back into exile, or have already done so in recent months. Some returnees choose, for security reasons, to live in the bush rather than in their previous homes in large towns. An international NGO reports that frightened residents recently began to flee Buchanan when they mistakenly thought NGO workers were evacuating that town. 3.   Potential for additional security incidents remains high in Liberia, particularly in border areas and in refugee zones of neighboring Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. Significant violence has already occurred twice in Liberia this year, in April and August. Odds are high that security incidents will occur in late 1999 or early in year 2000. Numerous groups have motive and capability to trigger sporadic violence. [See next finding for elaboration.] Recommendation International aid agencies in Liberia should maintain updated evacuation plans. Recommendation The international community should provide financial or logistical support to facilitate regular reporting by local journalists and human rights groups on events in rural counties.   Recommendation The Liberian government should allow local independent radio stations to broadcast news and information nationwide. The international community should provide support for these broadcasts. 4.  Several flashpoints for potential violence currently exist in Liberia: Liberian government security forces engage in periodic looting, particularly in response to real or contrived security threats. These forces perpetrated extensive violence in Lofa county in August, in response to an alleged incursion from Guinea. Government security forces deployed in Maryland county since August to "protect" against alleged threats of attack have contributed to increased local insecurity. Some Liberian soldiers or "ex-combatants" are disenchanted with President Taylor and complain about his broken promises to them. Insurgents in northern Liberia's Lofa county in August reportedly voiced anti-Taylor sentiments. Printed leaflets recently distributed in southeastern Liberia's Maryland county voiced opposition to the Taylor government. Liberian refugees in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire are capable of creating security incidents in Liberian border areas to strengthen arguments against the phaseout of UNHCR assistance programs. UNHCR is justifiably concerned that some Liberian refugees in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire are capable of creating security incidents in asylum countries to bolster their arguments for resettlement in the United States. UNHCR has recorded a significant increase in Liberian refugees' allegations that they are endangered in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. While some refugees' charges are valid, some security incidents cited by refugees appear to be exaggerated, contrived, or self-imposed. Tensions between Liberian refugees and local residents in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire might increase as UNHCR operations phase out and local integration of Liberian refugees in asylum countries becomes a reality. Recommendation The Liberian government, particularly President Charles Taylor, should impose proper accountability on the country's various security forces and should rapidly and publicly punish abuses by security personnel.   Recommendation UNHCR programs in Liberia, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire require substantially larger protection staffs to monitor and, if possible, help prevent incidents that aggravate insecurity in Liberia and its border areas. [See Section H below for elaboration on UNHCR protection needs. B.  Politics and Human Rights 5.   Liberians express widespread dissatisfaction with the current Liberian government led by President Charles Taylor. A large proportion of the Liberian population are convinced their government is not working in the best interests of the Liberian population. Many Liberians believe that basic government administration is corrupt and exploitive. Liberians regularly point out the lack of electricity and other basic services, the shortage of schools, and the absence of some government officials from their posts. Teachers in some counties report that government payroll administrators routinely confiscate up to 15 percent "fees" from teachers' small, irregular salaries. Many Liberians are convinced that a major new business arrangement between the Liberian government and a Malaysian company in the Buchanan area will produce virtually no Liberian jobs, despite Liberian government promises of 3,000 new local jobs from the deal. 6.  Popular disenchantment with President Taylor and his government is evident even in regions of the country previously supportive of Taylor. Even many citizens in Nimba County, Taylor's political base, express disillusionment with the Taylor government and feel abandoned by their president. Grassroots discussion of Taylor's links to the Americo-Liberian community has become more widespread and could eventually unite national opposition to the Taylor government.   7.   Political discourse needs strengthening in Liberia. The Liberian government, by most accounts, permits only a limited range of public political discussion. Journalists work within restrictions. Opposition parties are weak. The Liberian legislature has generally been inactive, with a few notable exceptions. The country lacks the type of robust political discussion needed to facilitate the country's difficult transition from war to a democratic peace. Recommendation The U.S. ambassador should maintain a high public profile in consistently emphasizing the need for political reform, accountability, and human rights. The new U.S. ambassador in Liberia should seek to create "political space" for proper civic debate in Liberia. The American ambassador should pointedly reach out to all sectors of society, including those few departments in Liberia's national and local government that make a serious effort to govern responsibly. The U.S. ambassador should regularly specify, publicly, reform steps the Liberian government must take to attract additional international support. 8.  Liberian society desperately requires aid programs that encourage democracy and good governance to strengthen the country's political and judicial systems, civil society, and the press. International donors are correct to doubt the current Liberian leadership's commitment to democracy and good governance. The people of Liberia have rarely, if ever, possessed a national government sufficiently committed to accountability, transparency, and human rights. It is important to lay the groundwork for good governance at this stage in Liberia's history, to nurture grassroots institutions and empower prominent Liberian individuals who are eager and willing to advocate for human rights, press freedoms, and government accountability. The U.S. government, under pressure from Congress, has curtailed funding for these projects in Liberia. Poor international funding for democracy and governance programs will cripple indigenous reform efforts and will strengthen the ability of current Liberian leaders to resist meaningful reforms. Abandonment of democracy-building programs at this time will increase the likelihood that future Liberian governments will be equally corrupt and unresponsive to popular needs. Recommendation The U.S. government should resume full funding for "democracy and governance" programs by the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute, and other qualified organizations. Congressional opposition to these programs in Liberia is unwise and counterproductive to Liberia's future stability. 9.  The most prominent bell-weather for human rights in Liberia, the highly respected Justice and Peace Commission, has been weakened by funding and staff reductions. Liberia's local Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) has a long track record of credible reporting and advocacy on human rights problems in Liberia. The organization operates on a modest annual budget of less than $100,000. Recent shifts in donor fundingùparticularly by the United Statesùhave affected JPC programs and are forcing staff reductions. JPC's internal struggles hurt the cause of human rights in Liberia and weaken the ability of Liberian civil society to pressure their government for human rights reforms. Recommendation The U.S. government and other international donors should provide funding to strengthen the Justice and Peace Commission, as well as other credible human rights organizations. JPC should remain a bell-weather for human rights in Liberia.   C.  Reintegration 10.  Many towns and villages have experienced significant progress in economic activity and reintegration in the past year despite weak local economies, thousands of war-damaged buildings, and approximately 200,000 refugees who remain in asylum. Economic and social activity beyond Monrovia remains a shadow of pre-war levels, but progress toward reintegration is visible. Villages long deserted are again becoming active, though not yet bustling. Residents and aid workers who arrived pre-1999 in key county capitals such as Harper (Maryland county), Zwedru (Grand Gedah county), Sanniquellie (Nimba county), and Buchanan (Grand Bassa county) report dramatic improvement particularly since May 1999 in the number of small shops, the availability of market goods, the number of homes under renovation, the re-establishment of churches and schools, and the gradual reinvigoration of local civil society. Recommendation Liberia's national leaders, including President Charles Taylor, should regularly visit all counties "up country" to foster reconciliation and demonstrate support for the efforts of residents to rebuild their local communities. Such visits might also encourage voluntary repatriation. Recommendation The Liberian government should ensure that local officials remain at their posts in rural areas and are responsive to the needs of local residents.   Recommendation International NGOs and funders should seek to expand development programs outside the capital and strengthen indigenous NGOs operating "up country." 11.  The level of population return varies enormously from town to town and county to county. Local residents estimate that rates of return range from 25 percent at some locations, to 75 percent at other locales. An estimated 60 percent of the normal population has returned to the town of Buchanan (Grand Bassa county), according to unofficial local estimates. Some 60 percent to 75 percent of the regular population has reintegrated in the town of Sanniquellie (Nimba county), local people estimate. Approximately one-third of the normal population has returned to the town of Zwedru (Grand Gedeh county), according to unofficial estimates. About half of the normal population has repatriated to the town of Harper (Maryland county), local citizens say. Some returnees have chosen for safety reasons to live in the bush rather than in main towns. It is believed they will reintegrate into their original homes in towns as more people return, urban economies improve, and the situation gradually stabilizes.   12.   Some ethnic Mandingo returnees in Lofa and Nimba counties are reportedly unable to regain possession of their homes and properties. The scope of this problem is unclear. Partial reports from several sources indicate that Mandingo families who have returned home after years of asylum or internal displacement have encountered difficulties regaining possession of their homes from squatters. In many cases, local authorities have been unable or unwilling to resolve these disputes. Recommendation International donors should provide resources to UNHCR/Liberia and the Liberian government's Refugee Repatriation and Rehabilitation Commission to investigate and address the problem Mandingo returnees have encountered when trying to re-occupy their homes in Lofa and Nimba counties. The problem appears to be occurring in some areas that are otherwise secure and accessible. 13.  Closure of the Liberia-Guinea border hurts local economies in Liberia's border area and impedes repatriation and reintegration. Closure of the Liberia-Guinea border since August has stopped UNHCR's organized repatriation program in that area and has virtually eliminated spontaneous repatriations. The border closure has choked off local cross-border trade conducive to economic reintegration and self-sufficiency in Liberia. Liberian farmers in border zones, for instance, are unable to purchase farm tools and livestock feed in Guinea because of the border restrictions. Recommendation The governments of Liberia and Guinea should agree to open the border and take steps to address security concerns on both sides of the border. D.   Liberian Society 14. Liberia's greatest need is a large-scale return home of the Liberian diaspora, many of whom are highly educated, professionally skilled, and politically sophisticated. Each individual Liberian in exile deserves the right to make an individual voluntary decision about whether to repatriate to Liberia. Liberia's economy and political system, however, sorely miss tens of thousands of Liberia's "best and brightest" who remain in exile. Recommendation Liberian refugees, exiles, and other Liberians living abroad should continue to consider the feasibility of returning to live in Liberia to help repair the economic and political damage in their country. Liberia's recovery is handicapped by their absence from the country. 15.  Numerous Liberians say they have virtually "given up" on the future of Liberia. A small but significant number of Liberians who have returned home in recent years are sending family members back into exile as a precaution against economic and political instability in Liberia. Numerous Liberians interviewed by USCR, particularly those with salaried jobs, report that they are taking steps to remove their families from Liberia because they lack confidence in the country's economic and political future. This is a consequence, as well as a cause, of continued unease in the country. 16.   A significant proportion of Liberian refugees and returnees display attitudes of dependency on international assistance after living up to 10 years as refugees. Many Liberians cling to cultural expectations that Liberians warrant special treatment from the United States. These attitudes tend to impede rather than facilitate the difficult task of repatriation and reintegration. The vast majority of Liberians are hard-working and resourceful people who have endured terrible hardships. There is reason for concern, however, that sections of Liberian society have become ensnared in a syndrome of dependency and inflated expectations about the aid they deserve or expect from the international community. Compared to other African refugee and returnee populations, many Liberians tend to expect a level of international assistance that is unlikely to occur, or a standard of living that is not immediately achievable in their country. Recommendation Liberian political, religious, and civic leaders should continue to stress the necessity of Liberians trying to find their own solutions to the country's difficult political, economic, and social reintegration problems. 17. Liberia's war has left a noticeable divide in Liberian society between young and old. This affects social reintegration. Ten years of war, looting, atrocities, and pervasive use of child soldiers have left a generational division in Liberian society. Liberian adults are acutely aware that child soldiers perpetrated massacres and that the long anarchy of war eroded respect for traditional authority among many Liberian youths. Adults express concern about the behavior of Liberia's young people, whom they regard as undisciplined, disrespectful, and volatile. Adults complain that the country's youth population is more likely to support Charles Taylor, less likely to accept discipline in school, and more likely to accentuate ethnic divisions than are older Liberians. Some residents complain that ethnic intolerance among youths is a major ingredient fueling ethnic violence in Lofa county between Mandingoes and Lomas. Recommendation Liberian schools, with support from international aid donors, should incorporate themes of human rights, reconciliation, and basic civics into all levels of curriculum. Schools and churches should receive support to provide special counseling and training programs to address the post-war needs of Liberia's youth population. E.   International Assistance Strategies 18.  Many Liberians, particularly educated professionals, understand that the U.S. government's lack of confidence in the Liberian government has curtailed American aid to Liberia. Liberian public opinion regarding U.S. policies toward their country appears to be divided. Many support a hardline U.S. policy toward the Liberian government even if such a strategy means only minimal U.S. assistance and investment in their country. Other Liberians deplore the limited aid provided to their country and complain that the United States and other donors are punishing average Liberians for the failings of their leaders. Recommendation The development aid strategy of the United States and other donors should be cautious, but not negligent. Carefully chosen projects should receive adequate financial and diplomatic support. Aid strategies should strengthen indigenous organizations while circumventing corrupt or unreliable departments of the Liberian government.   Recommendation In order to use limited aid dollars most effectively to support reintegration and development in Liberia, USAID should coordinate a special assessment mission to Liberia with Friends of Liberia, an organization composed of former Peace Corps volunteers and others with expert knowledge of Liberia. The purpose of the collaboration should be to identify and recommend grassroots projects worth funding throughout the country. USAID officials have been unable to travel extensively in Liberia because of security restrictions during much of 1999. They might lack sufficient information about the full range of reintegration and development projects that merit funding. Friends of Liberia would bring intimate knowledge of Liberia and unique grassroots access to this assessment project. Recommendation Aid projects that address democracy and governance issues" warrant priority, including programs that emphasize civic education, the rule of law, government accountability, and press independence. 19.  Micro-credit programs are important to facilitate reintegration and economic recovery in Liberia, and should be a funding priority. Liberian returnees need loans to start new businesses and jump-start local economies left devastated by the war. International donors with tight aid budgets prefer to fund programs that directly benefit the local population while circumventing Liberia's unreliable government. For these reasons, a strategy of issuing small loans to local entrepreneurs is well-suited to Liberia. Small loan programs are often difficult to operate successfully, however. Several NGOs, including the American Refugee Committee and the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help, have developed micro-credit programs for selected locations in Liberia. Recommendation Funders and NGOs should gradually expand micro-credit programs, drawing on the lessons of current loan projects operating in Liberia. Properly operated micro-loan programs should seek to diversify business activity beyond the usual soap-making and tie-dye enterprises. Small loan programs should provide special training for loan recipients to improve skills, business operation, and adult literacy. 20.   Liberia desperately requires road repairs to facilitate successful reintegration. Improved roads are the single greatest need for Liberia's economic progress, much-needed health care improvements, and agricultural gains. Seven years of war-related neglect and three years of heavy truck convoys carrying returnees and humanitarian aid have left many rural highways impassable nearly half the year, particularly during the rainy season. The importance of road repair is a strikingly constant theme among aid workers and residents throughout the country. Observed a British development worker in a remote rural county: "You will improve everybody's life, education, and health if you do roads. I can name a couple of holes you could fill in that would make a bigger difference in people's lives than anything I could do in a health clinic in 10 years." Road repairs are expensive and require heavy equipmentùprecisely the kind of program in which international funders are most reluctant to invest because of potential instability in Liberia. Yet improved roads would facilitate the economic progress needed to make Liberia's reintegration successful. Recommendation International funders should support at least modest road repairs and maintenance in important returnee areas such as Grand Gedah, Sinoe, and Maryland counties. Food-for-work programs should include road repair projects. 21.  Rehabilitation or construction of schools would help reinvigorate Liberia's educational system and provide a much-needed boost to the confidence of Liberian returnees struggling to re-establish normalcy. Liberian society places great emphasis on education. Villagers throughout the country regard school buildings as important proof of stability and as prominent institutions for village identity. School buildings, therefore, provide benefits beyond immediate educational assistance. Liberian communities have a willingness and resourceful ability to operate schools with minimal supplies and equipment. Recommendation Donors should support construction of classrooms despite shortages of school equipment. F.  Current Liberian Refugees: Demographics 22.  The actual number of Liberian refugees remains uncertain. This uncertainty has persisted throughout the decade. Official UNHCR statistics suggest that up to 260,000 Liberian refugees remain refugees in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire as of early November (120,000 in Guinea, 140,000 in Cote d'Ivoire). But the actual number might easily be fewer than 200,000 because large numbers of refugees have repatriated spontaneously without being counted. Recommendation UNHCR should continue to conduct verification exercises at selected sites in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire to refine estimates of refugee numbers. Donors should support continued census efforts planned by UNHCR. 23.   Analysis of available demographic information for the officially estimated 120,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea indicates: About 30,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea have registered to repatriate but have not yet done so as of early November. Up to 80,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea (two-thirds of the official 120,000 caseload) are either ethnic Mandingo and/or fled from Lofa county. Between half and three-quarters of Liberian refugees in Guinea are ethnic Mandingo. Nearly 50,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea originate from Lofa County (40 percent of the official 120,000 caseload). At least one-third of Liberian refugees in Guinea are school-age children.   24.   Analysis of available demographic information for the officially estimated 140,000 Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire indicates: 50,000 Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire have registered to repatriate but have not yet done so as of early November. At least 50,000 Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire (more than one-third of the official 140,000 caseload) are ethnic Krahn. About 50,000 to 60,000 Liberian refugees in Cote d'Ivoire (more than one-third of the total caseload) originate from Liberia's Maryland county, where concerns about security and petty harassment have increased in recent months. 25.  The estimated 200,000 to 260,000 Liberian refugees who remain in asylum consist of five broad categories, based on their reasons for remaining in asylum: Firstly, some Liberian refugees have real and legitimate fear of persecution if they repatriate. This group includes many ethnic Krahn and ethnic Mandingo refugees, and/or refugees from upper Lofa county. Although thousands of Mandingoes, Krahns, and Lofa residents have successfully repatriated, many refugees with these characteristics remain cautious. Secondly, some Liberian refugees do not fear immediate persecution, but they expect future instability in Liberia and therefore want to remain in asylum as long as possible. Thirdly, some Liberian refugees remain in asylum primarily for economic or educational reasons rather than security reasons. Private interviews with refugees suggest that many Liberian refugees remain in asylum for reasons that are based more on economic and "quality of life" considerations than security concerns. Fourthly, some Liberian refugees hope to gain admission and resettlement to the United States, a desire that cuts across all refugee categories. Refugees are aware of the U.S. resettlement program and often have unrealistic expectations that their own resettlement in the United States is imminent, according to UNHCR staff on the ground. Fifthly, some Liberian refugees are prepared to repatriate immediately when UNHCR resumes large-scale organized repatriations in late 1999, or when the Liberia-Guinea border re-opens to allow easy spontaneous return to Liberia. G.   Current Liberian Refugees: Repatriation / International Resettlement 26.  Closure of the Liberia-Guinea border continues to impede repatriation of Liberian refugees to relatively calm areas of Liberia. The closure also blocks the potential flight of new Liberian refugees trying to escape unstable areas such as upper Lofa county. Guinean officials have legitimate security concerns in the border area. Guinea's continued closure of the border, however, might exacerbate security concerns because it blocks voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees and raises tensions in Guinea between the refugees and local authorities. Guinea's security might improve if authorities allow Liberians to resume voluntary repatriation. In addition, insecurity in some parts of Liberia's Lofa county has reportedly uprooted thousands of Liberians since August. Some internally displaced Liberians might choose to flee to Guinea for safety if the border were open. Recommendation Guinea authorities should re-open their border with Liberia so that voluntary repatriations of Liberian refugees can resume and new Liberian refugees can reach safety in Guinea if necessary. The Guinean government has a responsibility under international refugee law to open its border for refugees seeking protection. If the border remains officially closed, Guinean officials should establish clearly defined "repatriation corridors" to allow Liberian refugees to return home in organized convoys or in spontaneous fashion. 27.   Recent insecurity along the Liberia-Guinea border will likely force UNHCR/Guinea to reconsider its plan to phase out programs for old-caseload Liberian refugees in early 2000. UNHCR/Guinea plans to end its organized repatriation program after December 1999 and plans to halt assistance to old-caseload Liberian refugees, including vulnerable groups such as elderly, disabled, and single women. UNHCR's programs to help Liberian refugees integrate into local Guinean society are scheduled to end in July 2000. This scheduled phaseout of UNHCR programs was initially reasonable. However, recent insecurity in Liberia's Lofa county and closure of the Guinea-Liberia border have delayed repatriation activities, forcing alterations in UNHCR's schedule. Recommendation UNHCR/Guinea and international donors should be prepared to extend the deadline for organized repatriation beyond December 1999. Recommendation UNHCR/Guinea and donors should push ahead with plans to reduce care and maintenance assistance for most old caseload Liberian refugees (those who arrived pre-1999) in favor of programs that facilitate refugees' self-sufficiency and local integration. UNHCR/Guinea should be prepared to extend local integration programs beyond the current July 2000 deadline if the border closure continues to block repatriation. Recommendation UNHCR/Guinea should be prepared to delay scheduled staff reductions in areas of Guinea that contain substantial Liberian refugee populations, such as the Nzerekore and Macenta areas. The border closure and insecurity in northern Liberia might keep Liberian refugees in Guinea longer than expected, necessitating larger staffs than planned. While maintaining adequate staffing for Liberian refugees, UNHCR and donors should add additional staff posts to improve protection and assistance for Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea. Recommendation The U.S. government and other donors to UNHCR/Guinea should increase funding so that UNHCR/Guinea can deploy adequate staff to monitor and assist some 400,000 Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees.   28.  Liberian refugees who are ethnic Krahn, ethnic Mandingo, and/or refugees who fled from Liberia's Lofa county are most likely to delay repatriation as long as possible because of concerns about ethnic tensions in Liberia and recent violence in Lofa county. Some might never repatriate as long as the present government remains in power. Incomplete demographic information regarding current Liberian refugees suggests that at least half of all Liberian refugees in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire are ethnic Krahn, ethnic Mandingoes, and/or fled from Liberia's unstable Lofa county. Although many refugees with similar demographic traits have already repatriated, refugees with these affiliations tend to believe they remain most at risk. An unknown percentage of these refugees are themselves former combatants or former politicians who might never repatriate during the tenure of the current Liberian government. 29.  Continued operation of Liberian refugee schools in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire will likely reduce repatriation flows. Some 40,000 Liberian refugee children attended 55 refugee schools in Guinea and nearly 100 refugee schools in Cote d'Ivoire last year. UNHCR originally planned to close the schools effective July 1999 to encourage voluntary repatriation and to integrate refugees into local Guinean and Ivoirien schools. In recent weeks, UNHCR and its implementing partners, the International Rescue Committee and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, have belatedly re-opened about 40 Liberian refugee schools in Guinea, and nearly 90 in Cote d'Ivoire. The schools re-opened for several reasons: closure of the Guinea-Liberia border is impeding repatriation; political tensions between Guinea and Liberia caused Guinean authorities to resist integration of Liberian students into Guinea's school system at this time; officials in Cote d'Ivoire insisted that Ivoirien schools are unable to absorb Liberian students this school year. Resumption of refugee schoolsùalbeit at a reduced numberùwill affect refugees' repatriation decisions in coming months. Liberians place a high priority on youth education. Many refugees will decide whether or not to repatriate at this time based on whether the best educational opportunities are found in Liberia or in asylum. Liberian refugees can be expected to weigh carefully the number of schools, class size, the language of instruction (English versus French), and the standard curriculum (Liberia's national curriculum versus local Guinean or Ivoirien curriculum) as they decide whether to remain in an asylum school or repatriate to Liberia to join the educational system there. Recommendation A reduced number of refugee schools should re-open in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. Re-opening too many schools, however, might act as a magnet for Liberians who have already repatriated and will probably discourage repatriation by some refugees who otherwise could return home safely. Recommendation The current school year for Liberian refugee children should serve as a transition to eventual integration with local educational systems. Refugee schools should emphasize French language instruction (the official language in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire) to prepare refugee students for eventual integration into the educational systems of Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. 30.  Liberian refugees tend to have unlrealistic expectations about their eligibility for rapid resettlement in the United States. Refugees' false expectations pose a serious administrative burden on under-staffed UNHCR programs in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, and pose a potential security threat for UNHCR staff. Liberians are generally unaware that the U.S. refugee resettlement program for Liberians has been restricted in FY2000. UNHCR programs in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoireùalready sorely understaffedùlack resources to thoroughly screen refugee candidates for resettlement in the United States. UNHCR staff maintain that they lack clear information about resettlement criteria used by the U.S. government. Many Liberian refugees mistakenly believe that resettlement in the United States is an inherent right being denied them by UNHCR staff on the ground, creating a potential security risk for UNHCR personnel. Recommendation The U.S. government, specifically the State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM), should make more resources available to UNHCR to help UNHCR's staff on the ground understand and implement proper procedures for U.S. resettlement of Liberian refugees. U.S. officials should initiate an information campaign in refugee zones to help refugees achieve a realistic understanding of limited eligibilities for the U.S. resettlement program. H.  Current Liberian Refugees: Protection Concerns 31. The number of UNHCR protection staff remains woefully insufficient in Liberia, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire. UNHCR has 2.5 protection staff in Liberia to monitor an estimated 300,000 returnees and 100,000 Sierra Leonean refugees. UNHCR has two protection staff in Cote d'Ivoire for an estimated 100,000 Liberian refugees spread along a 300-mile (500 km) border. UNHCR has five protection staff in Guinea for 400,000 or more Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees scattered among more than 100 sites in remote locations. Poor funding by international donors and inadequate budget appeals by UNHCR/Geneva have shortchanged the protection needs of Liberian refugees and returnees. UNHCR/Liberia is unable to monitor appropriately the safety of hundreds of thousands of returnees. UNHCR/Guinea and UNHCR/Cote d'Ivoire are unable to respond as needed to charges of worsening harassment against Liberian refugees by police in those two asylum countries. Responding to refugee applications for the U.S. resettlement program have placed additional demands on UNHCR's over-stretched protection staff. Recommendation UNHCR should immediately triple its protection staff in Liberia, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire. UNHCR headquarters in Geneva should issue a special appeal to fund more protection officers. The United States and other international donors should respond quickly to redress a protection situation that is fundamentally unethical and would not be tolerated in refugee crises in most other regions of the world. 32.  Liberian refugees in Guinea have encountered increased harassment and detention by Guinean police and military in the aftermath of the cross-border attack on Guinea in early September. Political and security tensions along the Guinea-Liberia border heightened after a Guinean village suffered an alleged cross-border attack by Liberian combatants in early September, leaving nearly 30 people dead. Guinean police and soldiers responded by intensifying security precautions in refugee-populated border areas. Guinean military were particularly visible during USCR's site visit in October in the town of Macenta, near the scene of the cross-border attack, where some 40,000 Liberian refugees live. Refugees in the zones of Nzerekore, Macenta, and Gueckedou report increased harassment by Guinean security personnel, including confiscation of refugee identity papers, demands for bribes, temporary detentions, physical threats, and insistence by some local police and soldiers that "there are no more Liberian refugees in Guinea." Recommendation Guinean authorities should cease harassment and arbitrary detentions of Liberian refugees and should discipline security personnel who persist in such practices. Guinean officials should publicly remind the Guinean population and local authorities that bona fide Liberian refugees are welcome in Guinea. 33.  Guinean authorities were slow to allow recognition and assistance to new Liberian refugees who fled to Guinea in August. Guinean authorities initially restrained UNHCR from identifying and assisting new Liberian refugees who fled to Guinea in August across the officially closed border. Guinean officials finally allowed UNHCR to help the newest refugees two months after they arrived. UNHCR/Guinea has identified 600 new Liberian arrivals in the Nzerekore area, but hundreds or thousands additional refugees who arrived in August might remain unidentified, particularly in the Macenta region. Recommendation The Guinean government should not withhold assistance to future new refugees from Liberia, as it did with new refugee arrivals in August. UNHCR should work aggressively to identify and offer assistance to refugees who have arrived in Guinea since August. 34.  Some 8,000 Liberian refugees living at Guinea's Daro camp near Macenta are dangerously close to the border. UNHCR/Guinea and Guinean authorities are establishing a safer camp site, but the transfer has proceeded slowly. As of late October, up to 8,000 Liberian refugees who fled from Upper Lofa county in April still resided in Daro camp (near the Guinean town of Macenta), located in an insecure area less than five miles from the Liberian border. A Guinean village near Daro camp suffered a an attack in early Septemberùallegedly by Liberian security forcesù that left nearly 30 people dead. Daro camp is a security risk to the refugees and to residents living near the camp on both sides of the border. UNHCR has finally obtained Guinean government permission to move Daro camp residents to a new site 30 miles (50 kms) from the border. Recommendation Transfer of Daro camp residents to a new location should be a priority. UNHCR/Guinea should complete the relocation as rapidly as possible. I.   Current Liberian Refugees: Assistance Issues 35. Ten years of serious problems with the Liberian refugee assistance program in West Africa have eroded international support for Liberian refugee programs and have damaged the credibility of Liberian refugees in the eyes of international aid funders. A long history of problems has undermined programs for Liberian refugees throughout the 1990s: persistent confusion over actual refugee numbers; suspicion of corruption among refugee leaders and local officials; ration card fraud; mismanaged UNHCR programs (particularly in Guinea pre-1998); disputes over refugees' capacity to support themselves; extreme logistical obstacles posed by poor roads, remote locations, and heavy rains; under-funded and under-staffed aid programs; security problems at refugee sites; wholesale looting by armed groups in Liberia of UNHCR and NGO vehicles and equipment intended for reintegration programs; and a pervasive sense that a significant number of Liberians remain in asylum for economic reasons rather than fear of persecution. These problems, coupled with the end of Liberia's war and the completion of national elections, have left the international community, including UNHCR/Geneva, determined to bring most assistance programs for Liberian refugees to an end despite lingering concerns about stability in Liberia. Recommendation UNHCR should continue to encourage voluntary repatriation by most Liberian refugees, except those who originate from Liberia's troubled upper Lofa county. Despite difficult conditions in Liberia, safe repatriation is feasible for many current refugees. UNHCR should continue to promote local integration and integration of old caseload Liberian refugees who are unable or unwilling to repatriate. 36.  Guinea has the largest refugee caseload in Africa. UNHCR/Guinea is attempting to operate refugee assistance programs on six levels simultaneously. It faces a formidable challenge with inadequate resources. UNHCR assistance and protection programs worldwide typically progress through six phases for each refugee population: firstly, contingency planning for potential new refugees; secondly, emergency response programs to assist and protect newly arriving refugees; thirdly, care and maintenance programs that provide sustained assistance and protection for long-term refugee populations; fourthly, repatriation programs for refugees who choose to return home; fifthly, local integration programs for refugees who wish to integrate permanently in their asylum country; and lastly, third-country resettlement programs for refugees for whom resettlement to other regions of the world is the best durable solution. A UNHCR country program typically operates in no more than two or three of these phases simultaneously. UNHCR/Guinea is forced by local circumstances to work simultaneously in all six phases of refugee assistanceùa rare and complicated challenge. Specifically: Concerns about potential new instability in Liberia have forced UNHCR/Guinea to draft contingency plans for the potential arrival of up to 150,000 new Liberian refugees. Nearly 10,000 new Liberian refugees who arrived in Guinea during 1999 (particularly during April and August) need UNHCR emergency response programs that will properly identify, process, and protect the new arrivals and establish a new, safer refugee camp farther from the border. UNHCR/Guinea has responded slowly to some emergency needs, such as the camp transfer and identification of the newest refugee arrivals. Approximately 300,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and the 10,000 newly arrived Liberian refugees require continued care and maintenance assistance. Poor funding, staff shortages, and local UNHCR mismanagement have consistently undermined the care and maintenance programs of UNHCR/Guinea during the 1990s. UNHCR/Guinea has demonstrated improved management in the past year, but budget shortages and under-staffing remain serious problems. Tens of thousands of Liberian refugees in Guinea await repatriation. The organized repatriation program of UNHCR/Guinea remains stalled because of political tensions between Guinea and Liberia, and recent violence in northern Liberia. Some 10,000 to 50,000 Liberian refugees might opt to remain in Guinea rather than repatriate to Liberia. Many of these refugees need help from UNHCR/Guinea to integrate locally and strengthen their self-sufficiency. Guinean authorities have sent ambiguous signals about their willingness to cooperate with integration programs, particularly in the aftermath of Liberian troops' alleged incursion against a Guinean village in September. Some Liberian refugees in Guinea have expressed interest in applying for international resettlement in the United States. Liberian refugees do not commonly understand the limited eligibility for this program. UNHCR/Guinea is attempting to operate these multiple levels of assistance programs despite inadequate budget, staffing shortages, difficult logistics at remote refugee sites, the largest refugee caseload in Africa, and with political and security tensions between the governments of Guinea and Liberia that have precipitated closure of the border and disrupted refugee movements. Recommendation With the largest refugee caseload in Africa and difficult working conditions, Guinea should be a top priority within the UNHCR system. UNHCR/Guinea needs significantly stronger support from UNHCR/Geneva and from international donors. UNHCR/Guinea is a traditionally weak program that has recently improved. It continues to face immense obstacles with meager resources. Recommendation The U.S. government should ensure that the U.S. refugee resettlement program reinforces rather than overwhelms UNHCR activities in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. The United States has a special responsibility to ensure that UNHCR programs in these two countries are not forced to divert staff from other important responsibilities in order to administer the U.S. resettlement program. J.   Sierra Leonean Refugees in Liberia 37.   Sierra Leonean refugees have fled from Liberia's upper Lofa county since August because of harassment by Liberian security forces and the end of humanitarian aid. Sierra Leonean refugees interviewed by USCR in October said they fled their camp in Kolahun during August and September not because of attacks by insurgents, but because of looting and harassment by Liberian security forces sent to Kolahun after an alleged insurgent attack. Some 12,000 Sierra Leonean refugees fled Kolahun and walked as long as a week to reach security and assistance in the small Liberian town of Tarvey. UNHCR currently is transporting the refugees to a new site at Sinje, about 30 miles (50 kms) from Monrovia. Poor roads have slowed the transfer by limiting the number of UNHCR truck convoys. Health and sanitation conditions at Tarvey camp are a concern. Recommendation UNHCR/Liberia should complete the transfer of Sierra Leonean refugees from Tarvey to Sinje camp as rapidly as possible. 38.   Food rations for Sierra Leonean refugees uprooted from Kolahun are inadequate. Sierra Leonean refugees who fled from Kolahun to Tarvey receive rations equivalent to 1,700 calories per dayù15 percent less than the 2,000 calories normally needed in emergency situations. Many refugee families exhaust even these limited rations before the next food distribution. As of early November, WFP and UNHCR tentatively plan to reduce daily rations for these refugees to 1,100 calories in Januaryùbarely half the minimum nutritional level needed for a population recently uprooted and in need of additional time to re-establish self-sufficiency. Recommendation Sierra Leonean refugees transferring to Sinje camp cannot be expected to become half self-sufficient by January. New refugees at Sinje camp require full food rations for several additional months before donors can reasonably expect them to support themselves.
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